The authors present the first However, firms must exert more time and effort to manage rebates than other promotions and must wair longer to assess the fu1ancial outcomes. They must review che rebate submissions, then pay the rebates. and finally wait for payments to be deposited (FTC 2007b This srudy is meant L O provide guidance to States .in their rebo.te lawmaking and to ruisc d1e issue thut perhaps u com· preheosive federal rebate law is needed. By discussing the academic research related co each rebal.e regulatiou nnd law, we hope t<.l assist policy makers and legislators in evaluating whet.her their past and proposed actions are evidence based (i.e .. research based). By discussing each rebate regularion and law. we hope 10 direCI researchers' anention ro policy areas that have not received enough re~-earch attention. and we identify specific research gaps. Our main goal is to facilitate policy makers' use of academic research findings and academics· consideration of policy maker concern~ regarding rebates..
R ebate. ·s offer consumers the henefit of rece . · iving a morn:-tary discount after purchase contingent on accurate and timely completion and submission of the redemption form. by mail or Internet, and deposit of paymen1 (Jolson, Weiner. and Rosccky 1987; Rothschild 1987; Tal, Cummine.- nam, and Babak:us J 988) . Rebates have become a prevale~r forrn of price promotion. Although exact figm-es are difficult ro obtain due to industry fragmentation and lack of a rebate industry association. the estimated value of rebates offered in the United States ranges from $4 billion to $10 billion per yt:ar t Edwards 2007). Rebates have several characteristics that differentiate them from other promotion); such as coupons and tcmporru)' price reductions. With rebates, consumers must ini· tially pay n higher prepromotion price. submit a redemption fom1 . and then wail for ~md cash the payment: with coupons and temporary price reductions. consumers instamly receive the IX>Slpromotion ptice. Funhermorc. rebates require consumers to exert effort after purchase to redeem and cash, whcrea~ coupons require effort beforehand to ohtain and present the coupon at the store. Finally, rebates. like coupons, nre paid only to those who exert effon, whereas tempornry price reductions ure given ro all buyers.
Rebates offer firms several benefits. First. firms can sell goods at two price points simultaneously to all consumers .;> 20:3, lt-nencar Ma'ket1 ng Asscc1at1:in ISSN 0743·9156 (p·m:l. 1!:47-7207 (electrooicl 255 in a s1ore: those who do not redeem the rebate pay the before-rebate price, aod those who do redeem the rebate pay the after-rebate price. Thus. firms may be able to offer steeper and/or more frequent price reductions with rebates rather tban temporary price promotions (Chen, Moorthy, and Zhaug 2005) . Moreover, firms can c11pitalize on consumer.,;' propensity to buy a product because of a rebate and later opt not to redeem (Soman 1998; Zaubermaa and Lynch 2005 ). This nonredemp1ion is often referred to as "breakage" or '·slippage" (Chen, Moorthy, and Zhang 2005) . Fi.an.~ can also structure the rebate terms in ways that may benefit them (e.g., in most states, firms can proousc payment within several months). Most retailers Jjke rebates as well, because customers reacL favorably LO the often dramafu:ally lower prices (Federal Trade Commission [ITC] 2007b) .
However, firms must exert more time and effort to manage rebates than other promotions and must wair longer to assess the fu1ancial outcomes. They must review che rebate submissions, then pay the rebates. and finally wait for payments to be deposited (FTC 2007b) . Thus, fin.ns often use fulfillment houses to perform thei;e functions, w.hich can lead to problems such as weak coordination or poor customer service. ln addition, consumer fraud js roore likely with rebates, including attempts to obtain multiple rebates from one purchase and theft of rebate cbecks (Joinl Industry Rebate Fraud Task Force 1995) . Finally, if enough consumers are angered by a rebate offer, this can tarnish the image of the sponsoring .fum and/or retailer.
Although rcbau...-s have become popular, consumers have expressed growing dissatisfaction with them (Edwards 2007) . For example, consumer complaims abouc rebates m the Better Business Bun:au rose 278%. from 964 in 200 I 10 3.641 in 2005 (Odell 2006) . Firms have also struggled wid1 numer011s problems related ro rebates. including consumer fraud. consumer redcmplion eJTOrs. and unexpectedly high redemption rates (Joint Industry Rebate Fraud Task Force 1995) . Ho.wever, specific complaints and oonccros aboul rebares have nor been systemarically documenced as yet.
In summary~ rebates are a unique nod popular form of promotion, and they offer consumers and frrms substamial benefits; however, they also generate a host of complaints and problems. This study presents lhe first comprehensive. mDllidisciplinary review of consumer rebates lhat includes both U.S. federal and state public policies and academic research findings. We begin by describing consumer and policy maker concerns regarding (I) rebate advertising.
(2) rebate redemption di!lclosures. (3) rebate redemption processes. and (4) rebate payment processes. Kext, we discuss federal regulations and srate laws aimed at addn:ssing each concern. Then. we review the academic: research in marketing, consumer behavior, psychology, and economics related to each concern. Finally, we identify research gaps and future research directions. We adopt a rat.her novel approach, in that marketing articles ~·pica!Jy rev.iew academic research (Compeau and Grewal 1998; Grewal and Coffi:peau 1992) . whereas law review articles typically review laws and regulations (Edwards 2007) . We integrate these two a.pproachc.~ because we beli~ve tbii> rnay be especially useful to policy makers, researchers. and conllumcrs.
There is no comprehensive federal law on rebates. bu1 the FTC bas issued nurncrous complaints about them. These complaints are typically followed by consent decree~ wherein firms conse01 w cease violative acchiities. Thus, we discuss the 18 federal complaints and consent decrees related to rebates. Io addition, we djscuss the 15 rebate laws from J l different suttes. 7 of which were enacted since 2007. Finally, in lhc Web Appendix , we list the 35 rebate bills that have been considered by Jegislawrs from 19 sta1es. because these bills document additional policy concem1> and could portend future laws.
This srudy is meant L O provide guidance to States .in their rebo.te lawmaking and to ruisc d1e issue thut perhaps u com· preheosive federal rebate law is needed. By discussing the academic research related co each rebal.e regulatiou nnd law, we hope t<.l assist policy makers and legislators in evaluating whet.her their past and proposed actions are evidence based (i.e .. research based). By discussing each rebate regularion and law. we hope 10 direCI researchers' anention ro policy areas that have not received enough re~-earch attention. and we identify specific research gaps. Our main goal is to facilitate policy makers' use of academic research findings and academics· consideration of policy maker concern~ regarding rebates..
Background on Federal and State Authority over Rebates
Federal rebate policies are governed by the FT'C. which relies on Sccnon 5(a) of tbc FTC Act prohibiting ~unfair or deceptive acts or practices" in commerce (FTC 2007a 
Rebate Advertisements

Concerns About Rebate Advertisements
No national survey or complaint content analysis hm, oocn performed to quantify consumers· concerns ribout rebates. bul tJ1e major cont.-ems are evident in the federal regulations and i;tate laws io Table 1 . One major concern is that rebate ads may not clearly and eonspicuoui.ly c<Jnvcy relevant pricl! information. lnscead. the ad~ may unduly empha. <:izt: the lower ufter-rebate price without clearly conveying that tJ1is price i5 comingcnt on suL:cessful rebate redemp1io11. A spe<.·ific criticism is that many rebate ads do not con~p1cu ously conve) the higher before-rebate price th111 consumer.. mUSt pay. Furthermore. many ads bighlighl rbe lower af1er-reba1e price, perhaps without even mentioning the word " rcbn1.e·· or the mail-in requirement. One result. a. s described by a consumer advocate, is th.at rebates "'induce s-ticker swoon, the opposi~ of stick~r shock, und entice consumers into buying products they might not al ways have been disposed to [buy]" (FTC 2007b, p. 62) . lf cousumer1-do nol successfully redeem the reb:ue. they may feel tJ1ey have purchased something they could not afford or did not want at thnl ptice.
For example, in Figure L Panel A, lhe rebate ad simpl) says "S39 .99 after rebate.'" so consumers are noc even LOld the price they mui;t ini tially pay. They must look on the retail sbelf or checkoul register to determine the beforerebate or purchase price. In Figure l , Other academic studies show that ads thar convey com· parative prices significantly influence consumer choice. In general., ads thal convey c.omparative prices (vs. those that do not) enhance the salience of price a~ a decision criterion and increase preference for the product with lowest price (Compeau and Gre wal 1998: Pechmann J 996 Other research has exammcd ho"' consumers respond ~vhen ~hown (vs . not shown) a high reference price, meanmg the regular price before it is marked down for a sole· a competitor's pnce. or a manufacturer's suggested rct~J pncc (l rbany. Bearden. and Weilbaker 1988) The findings indicate lhm a high reference price eohancci. a product's perceived \'alue nnd e<;pecially its transucuoo value. Transacuon value 1~ the: value of the deal and 1r. based on a compar1:.00 of a reference ~rice wilh the final ~elling pnce (Grewal. Monmc. and Krishnan 1998). Acquil.ition value. m i;wHrMt. is the: product's inherent value and is based on a trade-off between t11e product's benefits ond costs (Monroe 1990 baker 198~) and reduces price search tGrewal and Compeau 1992). TI111. suggests that a high before-rebate price could :;enc as 11 reference price and r1cld sunilo.r effects. However. in reference price srudJe!; consumers did oot acru:tll) pay the high reference pnce 1hey paid tbe lower ~ctlc or promoted price. Thus, it is not entirely clear whether consumer .. wall respond as fovorably to a high reb3tc rcfcren. ce price. because they will octuall) hilve to pa)' thlll high pnce at purchase .
Other research conducted hy rehatc practitioners indicates tha1 consumers a.re innuenc.!d by the rebate sav111gs ~mount. A uaoonal rebate admm~trator provided us w nh llcld stud) datu from a national drugstore retailer':. rebate ofter:.. The tlu10 mdicace that a high sa\ings nmoum c:nhunce.\ both rcb<11.c purch:.isc races uud redemption rotes. The avernge increlL.'>e in sale.' (relot1"c co expecled) was 3:?" fur SI rebates, 89CI for $10 reb<.llC!.. and 135% for S:W rcb:ues, and tlw average redemption rate \\as 7~ for SJ rc:bares. 27'1 for $!0 rebates. and 50'7( for $20 rebates. Consumers· sensrnv1cy co rebocc savings amounts likely becom~ even more pronounced when the sa\ings represent a lu~h percentage of the product price , consistent with W<:bcr·s lav. and Thaler's tran~uon utility theory (Grewal and Mam1on.lcm 1994) Research based on these theories ~ugge!>1S that u higher savings-to-price ratio also enhancei. a producr"s utili!)
Fmally. basic psycbological research on visual idenuficatton is relevant to the issue of whether consumer!> accurately 1den1ify rehace ads chat do nm conspacuouslv state the word "rebate .. 01 "mail-in.'· Nosofsky ( 1986) ~anunes people's recogmtmn of unfamiliar visual somuli nnd find:. that ix:uplc: have difficulty rccog11izing and classifying sumuh that do no1 resemble familiar exemphll'l>, panicularly 1f the surnuli resemble discrepant exemplars Thil> basic research suggests thm c<>n'>umers ma) ha\e difficulty accurate!)
identifying rebate ods if they lack staodard visual churacteristics (e.g., the word .. rebate" or ·•mnil-in")-espcciully 1f they visually resemble ads for instunt price reductions or sales. However, no rcsean-h has been conducted on va~uHI misidentification of rebate ads. so 11 1~ not eolirel} clenr to what extent these findings g<.·ncntJLlC Table 2 summarize"> the main l'Cl>Carch findings.
Policies Versus Research on Rebate Advertisements
In this section, we assesc; the federal and state rcbat~ act policies using the academic research To summam..c the policies. Connecticut ( 1988) and Rhode Island (2007) bno ads that sho\\ the lower after-rebate price, though the fl'C permit~ such atJ. as long as the sa\lofs amount ts ~hown ~escarch intlicates that the ma1onty of rebate ads emphasize the lower ttfter-rebntc price (Kim 2006) . Furthermore, research indicates that consumers react more favombly to ads that show the after-rebate price. reeardless of whether the savings amount ts also ~hewn (M~oorthy nnd Soman 2003). Thus. if policy maier.; want to djscoumge consumers from focusing on an after-rebate price lhat is continge..nl on .redemptJon, they mo~ want to ban ads showing that pncc and only allow ads i:howing the before-rebate pri~ and savingi.. us in Connecticut und Rhode lsJand.
California (199 J). New York (1994). and Ollnboma (2004) require ads lO state the high before-rebate price along with the after-rebate price tand/or savings), and the FfC require\ this given two or more promotions Research indicaks lhal a high reference price 1hnt will not he: paid (e.g., a presnle price) enhances perceived 1ransact1on 'uJue nod purchase willingncsi; (Bearden. Lichtenstein. and Teel 1984 : Della Bittn, Monroe. and McGinnis 1981 , Friedman. Wemgancn. and Friedman 1982 lnmnn, McAhster. and Hoyer 1990 , Keiser and Krum 1976 . Urhany. Beurden 1tnd Weilbakcr 1988 . raises estimate~ t>f the product'~ regular pnce (Urbany. Uearden, and \Ve1lbnker 1988), and reduces price search (Grewal and Compeau I C}q2) This md1recth suggests that consumers could be influenced b} a htgh before-rebate reference pnce to purchu~c the rebntoo product. wbich is not the intent of the Jaws. I.hough ll ii. unclear whether the rci.uJts gencrali7..C to lbi~ ~cenario. Rebate ads in Connecticut and Rhode Ii.land do not sbow a reference price becau~ col) one price cun be i.hown: the bclorercbate pnce and the savings Maryland (2008 ), New York (1994 , and Oklahoma {2004) requjre rebate ads to liUtte th1; mail-in requirement Extrapolating from basic re!>CarCh on visual identifica1io11 (Nosofak]' I 986), if a rebate ad foils 10 include th..: word "rebate" or "mnil-in" wid insLeud only states the lowe1 afterrcbate price and/or the savings. consumers could misconlrUC lhe ad ab being for a temporar) pace reJuction because that i'I what n visual!) r'Cl;Cmblcs. Thu.c;, requanng ads to staLC the mail-in requirement ~hould reduce conumer confusion. bul the ev1clence is indirect.
Research Gaps Related to Rebate Advertisements
There are several gaps in rcbilte advertl\IOI? rei-.earch \lirtu-all) no research has diroctl~ exam1ncd ~scomprehen~1on A specific research proposition is thal the more visuaJI)' prominent the before-rebate price und/or mail-in requirement in relation to the after-rebate price and/or sa . (Grewal and Compeau 1992) . and increase price comprehension (Haber and H ersh~n son 1973: Nosofsky 1986). However, moderators that make salient payment cost could weaken the effects on purchase (e.g., cost magnicude, payment method). [f listlug the before-rebate reference price with the after-rebate price encourages rebate purchases withom facilitating price comprehension, California. New York. Oklahoma, and the FTC might do well to reconsider their policies that encourage firms LO fist both prices. Table 3 shows tbe rebnle rcscnrch propo~i tions.
Rebate Redemption Disclosures Concerns About Rebate Redemption Disclosures
Another major concern about rebates that iii reflected in redernl regu!ntioos aod state laws is that the redemption disclosures may not ulwuys be clear and conspicuous with respect to the screening criteria, tem1s, and/or conditions. \\'hen consumers learn the te1ms of the rebate or w.hat they must <lo m redeem, they may feel baited or that it was a "ripoff th~1l wasn ' t worth the time and aggravation'' (FTC Journal (2007) . consumers saw rebate ads without the redemption criteria or '·anything about rbeir natm:e or signjftcance" and were unaware of '"uousual and restrictive terms and conditions"' such as Lhat uthcy would not be able to submit a request for r:he rebate until as much as six. months after purchase." The ftrm was required to conspicuously disclose in rebate ads all unusual and restrictive terms and conditious, including wui! period and re{luired records.
Redemption form provision has been mandated in three consent decrees. specifying provision by the time of slUpmeoc and/or for offer duration. In FTC 1•. Cape fl (200 I), the furn advertised that rebates were available but took eight lO ten weeks to provide the redemption fo1m s. by which time many rebates bad expired. The firm was required to provjde the forms "at or before the time of shipment.'" 1o USA v. Iomega (1998) , the redemption fom1s were not consistently available at retail outlels. and there was inadequate staff to handle requests for forms. The firm was required to provide redempti. on fonns for .. the duration of the offer.'' (FTC 2007b, p. 15) .
State Laws
States are concerned about rebate redemption disclosures and redemption fonn provision as well. Nonh Carolina (2007) requires that the following basic redemption information be conspicuously printed on the redemption fo11ll: "(I) the tenns of the rebate~ (2) requirements for a valid claim, incl\Jding any additional i:ofomiatio11 to be submitted with the rebate form: (3) the ex'J)iration dnte of the rebate offer, if applicable": and (4) "the telephone number or email address of the person. finn. or corporation that is offering tbc rebate.'' New York (2010) requires that both firms and retailers disclose ooncash rebate payments and fees.
Maine (2006) (Lynch and Zauberman 2006; Soman 1998; Zaubcrman and Lynch 2005) . Most studies do not diJeclly investigate rebates. but they assess similar sitwi.tions such ns delayed financial rewards. Soman's (1998) srudy concludes that future financial rewards are ove:rweigbed reJative to future effort, making the rewards appear more attractive initially than later on, when effort i$ required to obtain the · rewRrds. Specifically, people were more likely to choose a large delayed payment involving effort over a smaller instant payment involving no effort: however, later. many people failed to exert the effort and received no payment.
Numerous other studies show that people tend to be overly optimi.c;ric about their likellhood of completing future task.~. Studies on resource slack show that people tend to overestimate the amount of time they will bave in focure because they do not recogni1..e that other activiries will C-Ompete for their time: thus. they overcommit to future tasks (Zauberman and Lyncb 2005) . Studies on the plnnning fallacy indicate that people make over!} optimistic predicrion$ about finishing future tasks (Buehler 1983. 1985. 1986. 1987) . The findings cnclicate that consumers typically do l1ot .read information disclosures (Wilkie 1982>. because they lack tilt! motivmion, ability, and/or opponunity due to competing goals. Jack of knowledge, time constr.iints. andlor other factors Martin 1994. 2004 ). This finding suggests that ghrlng consumers the rebate redemption re.quiremems bi!fore pllrchase may have a Umited impact on improving their decision making.
However. one sn,dy -required (vs. did not require) consumers to read rebate redemption requirements before purchase, and the results were promising (Silk 2004). Consumers who were required to read the requirernenrs were less likely LO purchase the rebated product: in addition, if they did purchase. they were more likely to redeem and lo be satisfied with the redemption process. Purchase rate$ decreased because prospective buyers more accurately calibrated their (low) likelihood of redeeming. Those who bought were more likely to redeem nnd felt more satisfied because they knew what to expect. This study suggest<> that it ma>' be important to prov.ide rebate redemption forms at purcha~e so consumers at leas1 have the opportunity to read the forms , even if mtmy will forgo this opportunity Mart.in 1994, 1004) .
Some research suggests that simply providing consumec. with a rebate redemption form at purcha.-.e may also increase redemptions. because the form may provide a U!>e-ful memory cue. Numeroas smdies on prospective forgetting indicate that people tend to rely on physical cues in the eovironmen1 to remind them to perform future tasks and that such cues cao be highly e ffective (Krishnan and Shapiro J 999; Marsh, Hicks, and Wat.soo 2002; Shapim and Krishnan I 999). Thus, if redemption forms are given at purchase, they might serve as a useful rnemory cue. thereby increasing redcmptfons.
Policies Versus Research on Rebate Redemption Disclosures
Overall. the main poliC}' goals regarding rebate redemption are ro ensure lha1 consumers know what the redemption criteria are, paiticularly if they are unusual and restrictive, and to ensure that consumers are provided with redemption fom1s in a timely way. However, methods to achieve these goals vary widely. The FrC requires rebate ads tO disclose unuima1 and rcstriccive redemption criteria and requires redemption f01m provision by shipment andior for offer duration. North Caro- (Silk 2004) indicates that it may be useful to provide redemprion farms at purchase. because :if consumers read the redemption criteria, they arc more like'ly to calibrate thei.r redemption Likelihood accurate.ly. Fewer will ouy. and those who do bu)\ will be more apt to redeem . The problem is that consumers may not read the redemption criteria due to low motivation, abHiry, andior opportunity (Stewart and Maitin 2004) . To address this problem, the redemption form may provide a cue that reminds con-S"Umers to redeem. increasing redemptions that way (Krish- 
Resea rch Gaps Related to Rebate Redemption Disclosures
The main unanswered questions regarding rebate redemption disclosures are whether significant numbers of consumer:> will actually read rebare redemption requirements if rhey receive them before the purchase decision at1d what factors may affeci this. Research shows that consumers make better decisions if required to read the rebate redemption requirements (Silk 2004) . but it also shows that consume~ rend not w read such disclosures due to lack of motivation. oppcmunity, and/or ability Martin 1994. 2004) .
According to the research indicating the low attention to and impact of dis.closures Martin 1994 , 2004) , il seems importmlt that any approach to providing rebate redemption requirements should focus o:o maximizin g attenrion co the information. One approach could be to develop a shore, color-coded, tabular form for rebate redemption disclosures that contains just the most imponant facts (e.g .. requirements: serial number from box and onepagc form: deadline: 30 days; payment: within 30 days) and that flags anything unusual in i·ed. A controlled experiment could compare this new form with the standard form , and the measured outcome could be rebate purchases and redemptions. The research proposition is as follows: Consumers who are (vs. ure not) provided wjtb a short. colorcoded. and tabular form for rebate redemption disclosures at point of purchase are less likely to purchase. the rebated product. and if they do purchase, they are more likely to redeem. If this form is effective, it could conceivablv bccE>me an industry srnndard .
-
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Rebate Redemption Processes
Concerns.About Rebate Redemption Processes
There are also significant concerns about rebate redemption processes-in particular, that con:rnmers might procrastinate and fail to submit the redemptfon fonn by the deadline.
Many policy makers believe "offer expiration dates (are] too short" (FfC 2007b, p. 78) , and therefore, there is substantial Jegislation about this. Another concern is that consumers may not he notified of noncompliance in suffic.ieur time to allow them to fix problems. Furthermore, redemption may seem time-consuming, effortful, onerous, and/or restrictive, such as the requirement that the original sales receipt be submitted. Firms' reasons for rejecting redemption forms as noncompliaut may also seem unfair or unclear. Overall, there is a concern that some firms may try ro impose redemption requirements that thwart redemptions to reduce their payouts. As one consumer advocate opined. "There are a lot of companies spending a lot of time and money trying to maxim ize how many of those mistake~ consumers can make. and increase breakage, or rebate denials" (FfC2007b, p. 63).
Completion of a rebate redemption fonn can ofr.en be effortful, requiring consumers to .fill in buyer name, address, telephone number, and signature; the dealer name and purchase date: and/or the product serial number. The fom1 may also require consumers Lo attach the origi:nal sales receipt or a copy, andfor part of the package with the serial number. primarily to deter ·fraud. But finding the se1fal number on a package may be d.iffi.ctilt A oon:sumer advocate described a case i.n which "itturned out the [serial] number ... was a number you coulcln't actually see with the naked eye .. (FTC 2007b, p. 65) . Unclear noncompliance notifications may further discourage consumers; for example, i.o Figure 2 . Panel A, the notification was indecipherable: "Your ESN/MEID bas already been associated with a pievious rnbate."
federal ReguJations and State Laws on Rebate Redemption Proeesses
Federal Regulations
The FrC has not addressed rebate redemption processes in its qqmplaillts or conse11t decrees. Apparently, it bas not found company behavior related to redemption processes to be violative of the FTC Act or the Mai.I Order Ru.le.
State Laws
States have primarily beer1 concerned about two issues related to rebate redemption processes: (I) that firms provide adequate time for consumers to s1ibmit redemption forms and restibmit noncompliaot forms and (2) that fo:ms do not penalize spec.ific consumer groups (e .g., those with post-office boxes) when trying to deter fraud. Although many states are co.ncerncd about giving consumers adequate time to redc.-em., they disagree on cbe details. In New York (2005) and Washiogto.n (2009) , consumers mus! be given at least 14 days t. o redeem. In North C<U'olina (2007) . they must be given at least 30 days but no more than six months . .In Texas (2007) , they must be given ~O days to resubmit a noncompl.iant forrn, and they must be informed 
Redemption Processes
Academic 11tudies on deadlines consistently demonslrate that people actually respond better to shon deadlines hef:ause this discourages procrastination and reduces forget1ing (Ariel) and Wenenbroch 2002: Sha and Gneez.y 2010; Silk 2004; Tversky and Shafir 1992). For example , tao;k complellon rates tend to be higher for shoner deadlines relative w longer one:.. Tversky and Shafir (1992) paid students to complete a questionnaire by a deadline of five days, three weekc;. or no deadline: tbey observed comple1ion ralcs of 60%, 42%, and 25%, respectively. Ariely and Wcrtenbroch (2002.) find that students who set longer deadline~ were less likely to complele assignmenl'S. Silk (2004) observes IC1w~r rebate redemption raies as deadlines were lengthened from I day (77%) to 21 days (59%).
Shu und Cineezy (2010) find that people expect~d to do better wilh long deadlines but. in Teality. did better with shon deadline.,, Students were offered a $6 gift certificate with c11her a three-week or a two-month expiration . Wht:rca!. studenu, with lbc longer expiration bad higher expcctalions of redeeming it (68% vs. 50%), studen~ with the shorter exprrntion ncruaUy redeemed i i at a gr~r rate (31 o/r V!>. 6% ). A follow-up study showed that a longer deadline wos C!>peciall) problematic when tbe cost to redeem was high Swderus were briven a free movie ticket w11h ei1hcr a cwo-or six-week redemption. The cx.piration date did no1 matter when the theater was close Oow cost 10 rcclccm ). hut a longer expiration deterred redemptions when the themer wus far.
Other researc h has examined how rebate redemption ..:!Ton al'fccts redemption rar~. and it indicates this relationship moy be curvilinear. Soman (1998) asks consumers t0 complete a form thot was tiitber four or t:ight pagci. long in exi.:h111lgc for money. S() lhe t.ask was quite similar to rebate rcdempuon. The longer tonn decreased the completion rate c;ignificantly. from 43% ro 24%. in comrnst, Silk (2004) C>.phcitly manipulates the effort required ro redeem a rebate without disclosing the effon at purchase and observed effects oppos11e 10 Soman (J 998). Increasing the effort increased the redemption race mar<~nally from 63'k (average effort) 10 74% (far-above-average effort). Consumers reported thot the effortful form was unfair and unreasonoble, causmg them 10 oy harder. This wodc suggests that a more efforrfuJ redemption tru.k will likely lower lhe redemption rate. except perhaps if the task is perceived as unfair Moreover, iew rei.carcbers have assessed consumer rci.ponsc to rcbflte a.oucompliance notifications ro derermine the common attributions made. However. researchers h;ivc stodie<l how consumers react to similarly unfavorable ~venLc;., often ui.ing attrtbulion theory (He:ider 1958: Weiner I 985). The gcncnil finding is thm when consumers experience a.n unfavorable event. they try to attribute it to a specific cau~e They may make internal attributions and ascribe c:iuslll 1ty to the ~elf, or the)' may make c>..ternnl attributions and ascribe causalit) to the firm. which is more likely if they perceive tbe finn ru. being in control and exhjbiting a pattern. When a firm i;cnds out noncompliance not.tfications, some consumers may perceive this as being under tbc finn 's control and $tandurd practice. evoking negative external attributions. Negative external acuibutioa.s often resuh in djssutisfacrion. complaining, and/or avoidance (Weiner 2000) .
Silk (2004) directly exo.mmes consumers· attributions about rebate rcdt:mption failures and assessed oULcomes. Consumers wbo foiled lo redeem a rebate successfully ancl made external attributions (e .g., '"the criceria were unclear"') rather than internal Httribulions (e.g., "J did not read tbe criteria") reported less intcre.~t in purchasing another rebated product. This finding suggestS Chat firms should encourage internal attributions about redemption fai lures le.g .. by clearly explaining to consumers what they did wrong and assisting ll1em in correcting tbcir mistakes).
Finally, s1udies indicate thut consumers often have considerable persuac;ion 1..-nowledge. menn~ Ja-1owledgc about marketers' persuasive motives and tactics (Campbell and Kirmani 2000) . Studies also show thut persuasion knowledge become salient when consumers detecl that a finn rn~1y have ulterior motives. evolung suspici.on. Th.is could huppen if consumen> who receive rebate noncompliance notifi· cations suspect thw firms muy have ulterior motives.
Policies Versus Research on Rebate Redemption Processes
To summarize CWTCOt policy on rebate redemption processes. there i~ no explicit federal policy because no FTC consent decree has addressed rebate redemption proces.ses However, several state laws address them. Certain states require thal consumers be given at least 14 days to redeem Tf the goal is to help more consumen. red~m rebnles. mandating that they be given a l least JO days is unlikely 10 be effecli\'e because il is based on an invaJid assumption that too little acne ii: the problem. Mandating thal consnmers be ghen no more than 1.~ months (!\orth Carolina 2007) recognize~ Lhl.ll too much ome is the problem, but it does not go far enough. The research indicates tbal redemption rates would be higher 1f consumers were given no more tban one to two weels. However, consumcn; most be me<k aware of tbe i.ubmission deadline at purchase to ensure the) do not procrastinate, only later to discover Lhat lhe deadline has passed. Thus. the cfuclosure of deadlines at poim of sale seems necessary for this to be effective. In addition. consumers would probably oeed to be informed of the rationale for prnviding such a sh(111 deadline (Campbell and Kirmani 2000) . This research suggests that firms should a\'oid redemption procesi; requiremenrs that consumers may perceive as unfair.
Research Gaps Rela1ed to Rebate Redemption Processes
Perhaps the main Iesearch gap related to rebate redemption processes is that the research indicating shon (one-ro two-week) deadlines are better than Jong ones is based almost entirely on student samples and task5 unrelated to rebates (Ariely 2007) . for example, "Ninety-five percent of consumers who received rebates in this promotion received them oulside of and beyond the twelve-week outer limit thu1 was promised. The average was twenty-four weeks. and some waited for a year" (FfC 2007b, p. 17) . When lhere are delays, consumers may have difficulty finding out if or whe.n they w.ill be paid. Yet another concern involves nonstandard payment mailers that "loo_ k a Jot Hke junk mail'' (FfC 2007b. p . 62) . Figure 2, Wttb regard to rebaLe advertisements, policy makers have focused primarily on price claims. Some policies ban ads that state the lower after-rebate price. particularly if the suvings amount is lacking, and/or require ads to stale lhe higher before-rebate pcicc and/or the maiHn requirement.
The academic research indicates thal banning ads with the lower after-rebate price shou.ld decrease consumers' focus on net prices during pnce comparisons (Compeau and Grewal 1998; Pechmano 1996) and decrease rebate purcha!>es (Moorthy and Soman 2003) , though effects oo price comprehension are unknown. However, requiring ads to state the word "rebate" and/or t.he mail-in requiremenr should reduce mjscomprebensioo (Nosofsky 1986) . The effect of requiring ads to state the higher before-rebate price is uncertain, because a higher reference price can increa. <;c transaction valne and purchase willingness (Bearden, Lichtenstein, and Teel 1984) , but in the case of rebates, i1 also 268 Polley and Research Rela;ed to Consumer Reba1es coaveys the nigher price that mus1 be paid. a11d the net effect is unknov.11.
With regard to rebate redempti011 disclosures. policy makers have required clisclosllre of unusual and restrictive redemption criteria in ads, I.he basic redemption criteria on forms, and/or noncash payments. Policy makers have also required the provision of redemption forms at point of purchase, with the product and/or :in rebate ads. The research indicates that it should be beneficial to provide redemption forms at purchase so consumers at least have the opportunity to read the redemption reguirement.s. If' consumers read lbe requirements, they may he less likely to purchase rebaced products. and if they do purchase, they way be more likely to redeem and more satisfied (Silk 2004). However, due to the cbalJenges inherent in infonnation clisclosure (Stewan and Martin 2004), more research is needed to determine if it is possible to create simple, coJor-coded forms with rebate redemption disclosures that consumers will truly read before purchase.
Regardrog rebate redemption processes. policy makers have focused on providing enough time for consumers to submit redemption fonns, r:ypicaay mandating at least 14 or 30 days. However, the Ie.<;earcb indicate.'\ tbal the problem with redemption failure is not roo litde time but rather too much lime (Arlely and Wertenbroch 2002; Situ and Gneezy ::?010), though consumen; tend lO think the opposite (Shu and Gneez.y 2010) . Thus, policy makers should consider reqnidng no more than one to two weeks 10 redeem and also requiring disclosure of the deadline at purchase. Additional field Stu.dies muy be needed, though, to convince policy makers of the need to chnnge their policies mandating long deadlines for rebate redemption. Pun.hennore, policy makers have sougbt to protect ce.rtain consumer groups from being unfairly penalized by firms ' fraud-fighting tactics (e.g .. banning post-office box addresses), and related research indicates that policies that are perceived as uofair could be counterproductive and deler future rebare purchases (Campbell and J:Grmani 2000: Silk 2004) .
Finally, on rebate payment proce..<;,.<;es. policy makers have required payment within the time specified or a cenain number of days, which has varied from 30 to 60 to 90 days. The research :indicates that consumecs generally prefer to be paid within 30 days (Kim 2006; Soman 1998) and thm a 45 day delay is often too long (Kim 2006) . This is in part because consumers discount furure rebate payments; they realize money is worth more now than later (Frederick. Loewenstein, and 0-Donogbue 2002; Pyone and lsen2011: Thaler 1981) . Policy makers have also cnandat.ed that payment mailers be labeled, which should lower misidentification of nonstandard mailers <Nosofsk'Y 1986}. but some research is needed to ·determine which nonstandard mailers are most problematic and why.
Overall, more research is ncc<led on Lbe prevalence of specific problems and concerns relatecl lo rebates. We were unable to identify any database on rebate complu.ints, so we advise that these data be collected for the population at large and for differenc consumer segments (e.g .. on the basis of consumer age. ethnicity, state of residence). along with key rebnre characteristics (e.g., product category, price. saving amount. onhne vs. in-store purchase). In addition, rebate ads. redemption fonns. and noncompliance notifications should be coded to identify common and prob· lematic content and clarity and reading level$.
Other areas of research beyond I.hose discu-.sed here could possibly be applicable to understanding consumer response to rebates , but their relevimce ii; uncermin because studies are Jacking. For example. according Lo prospec1 theory (Kahnemnn and Tversky 1979) . it might be the case that consumers' pm-chases of rebated products reflect preference for a .i;i.st...y option (i .. e., quality x for uncertain price y), which suggests consumers might possibly be in a loss mode. Later on, consumers might perceive che siniation differently, which could explain certain failures to redeem. However, this is not knovro. becauSt: prospect tbeor)' ha~ not been applied to rebares.
We hope ibat, by summarizing tbe exlanl re~eh thm i!> relevant to rebares and by identifying major research gapi.. this :article encourages more academic sruc:Lies oo rebates. lo addition, by provic:Ling: policy makers with a comprehensive overview of academic research, federal regulations. and sr.are laws on rebates. we hope they will consider all of th~ information in their future policy decisions. Coocetns about rebates are stimulating considerable legislative acth·ity. and the laws thlil are enacted shou1d be e\•idcnce based.
